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Abstract — As cryptographic implementations are increasingly 
subsumed as functional blocks within larger systems on chip, it 
becomes more difficult to identify the power consumption 
signatures of cryptographic operations amongst other unrelated 
processing activities. In addition, at higher clock frequencies, the 
current decay between successive processing rounds is only 
partial, making it more difficult to apply existing pattern 
matching techniques in side-channel analysis. We show however, 
through the use of a phase-sensitive detector, that power traces 
can be pre-processed to generate a filtered output which exhibits 
an enhanced round pattern, enabling the identification of 
locations on a device where encryption operations are occurring 
and also assisting with the re-alignment of power traces for side-
channel attacks. 
Keywords; side-channel attack, phase-sensitive detector, 
cartography. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cryptographic functions are increasingly incorporated into 
embedded devices such as mobile phones and other portable 
computing devices to enhance security. Although encryption 
offers a high level of theoretical security for the data that is 
stored on the device, the underlying hardware that implements 
the encryption algorithms has been shown to leak side-channel 
information. This side-channel information can be recorded 
through the use of probes connected to a device’s internal 
circuitry, or through less invasive means such as with a non-
contact electro-magnetic probe. The gathered data can then be 
statistically processed to uncover the key that secures the 
underlying encryption algorithm and thus enables the 
decryption of all data previously encrypted with the same key. 
These threats are not just of theoretical interest, but reflect 
vulnerabilities in real-world devices as illustrated in [18, 20]. 
In order to mount a successful side-channel attack, an 
attacker needs to obtain a set of well-aligned power 
consumption traces. Devices running various concurrent 
operations may process encryption routines in varying time 
segments. Measurements taken from real world devices will 
also seldom have a readily available trigger source to 
synchronise the extraction of the power waveform data. This is 
required since an attacker will want to compare the same point 
in time for each encryption operation. Misalignments may also 
be intentionally introduced as a countermeasure in the form of 
random delay insertions [21]. These factors contribute to make 
it more difficult for an attacker to successfully gather the power 
traces and also to identify the target cryptographic processing 
sequences from within the side-channel data. The first 
contribution of this paper is to introduce the novel application 
of a phase-sensitive detector to enhance power traces for 
realignment and side-channel attacks. 
Power analysis traces are generally recorded with an 
oscilloscope, measuring the supply voltage drop across a load 
resistor, and consist of the macro level power consumptions of 
the device. Although the trace captures the encryption related 
processing power, it will also consist of the contributions from 
other concurrent processing activities, effectively adding noise 
to the signal. The power traces also contain a certain amount of 
electronic, algorithmic and quantisation noise that will vary 
between successive acquisitions. This noise effect can be 
overcome to a certain extent through the use of filtering to 
improve the signal to noise ratio and through the averaging of 
large numbers of traces in the statistical analysis. 
Another source of side-channel information is electro-
magnetic emanation. Here an attacker typically uses a less 
invasive near-field sensing probe, with the aim of extracting 
power consumption signatures that are more localised to the 
encryption processing whilst reducing contributions from other 
unrelated regions of the device. The question then arises as to 
where the probe should be placed to gain the optimal data for 
the attack? Side-channel cartography is a technique that can 
assist with answering this question by enabling the precise 
placement of a probe across the surface of a device under 
control of a scanning platform. Our second contribution is to 
demonstrate how the phase-sensitive detector can also be used 
to perform a pattern extraction to quickly identify areas of the 
device that contain the encryption signature and thus represent 
advantageous locations for focusing the gathering of side-
channel information.   
This paper is organised as follows; Section II provides 
background information and discusses previous research in the 
area of side-channel attacks. Section III describes the phase-
sensitive detector filtering method we are proposing. Section 
IV details the experimental setup and presents results for the re-
alignment and correlation power analysis (CPA) attack on an 
FPGA implementation of the AES algorithm. We then 
demonstrate how the phase-sensitive detector technique can be 
extended to characterise an encryption signature and use this to 
identify relevant regions of electromagnetic emanation in a 
cartography analysis of an FPGA device. 
II. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
A. Side Channel Attacks 
Side Channel Attack (SCA) techniques were first published 
by Kocher et al. [1], with a timing analysis of exponentiation 
operations in a cryptographic device and subsequently through 
the technique of Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [2]. Later 
this research was expanded by Quisquater et al. in dealing with 
electromagnetic (EM) waveforms in Differential Electro-
magnetic Analysis (DEMA) [3], with further experimental 
results published by Gandolphi et al. [4] and Agrawal et al. [5]. 
In these attacks, the measurements capture a time domain 
representation of the power consumption during a 
cryptographic operation. This power consumption can be 
compared against a modeled set of hypothetical power 
consumption values via a statistical analysis such as the 
Pearson correlation coefficient, as introduced by Brier et al. 
with Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [6]. Let the correlation, 
     be a function of the hypothetical power model, H, and the 
measured power, P, such that; 
                       
  
 
                
         
          
 
                          (1) 
Where   and   relate to the mean of the respective 
hypothetical and measured power data sets and where    and  
   refer to the individual hypothetical and measured power 
trace elements, at a particular instant in time. The reader is 
referred to [21] for a comprehensive overview on power 
analysis attacks. 
B. Side-Channel Cartography 
Side-channel cartography is the multi-dimensional analysis 
of a device for side-channel attacks. This approach was 
described by Quisquater et al. for Smart Cards [3] and then 
extended by Sauvage et al. to identify side-channel emanation 
hot-spots in an FPGA [12, 17]. The approach of surface 
scanning electronic circuits is already widely used in industry 
for the qualification of circuits for electromagnetic emissions in 
ISO/IEC standard 61967 [13]. 
Whilst power analysis data can be simply measured as the 
time-varying voltage drop across a fixed load resistor, for an 
electro-magnetic (EM) analysis the attacker usually has a probe 
that needs to be placed in a suitable position to record localised 
readings of the electric or magnetic field strength. Problems 
arise as to where the optimal point to position the probe is, 
particularly for small probes suitable for high resolution 
scanning of discrete points across the device, such as the 
approach described in [12]. Although Sauvage et al. used a 
cross correlation technique to find areas of self-similar 
emanation in [17], they did not identify whether the locations 
were emanating encryption related information or not. 
C. Advanced Encryption Standard 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric 
block cipher adopted for use as US Federal Information 
Processing Standard - 197 [7]. AES has a fixed block size of 
128 bits, with optional key size usage of 128, 192, and 256 bits. 
In this paper, the 128 bit key AES implementation is used, 
which processes 10 intermediate rounds between plaintext 
input and ciphertext output. 
The target for the attack is a specific point in time during 
the algorithm when it is processing some intermediate value 
that is data dependant with the secret key. For iterative 
hardware AES implementations, a suitable location is the 
register transfer between rounds 9 and 10 allowing us to build a 
Hamming-distance power model. As the MixColumn operation, 
which operates on 32-bit words, is not present in the final 
round, the model can be built for 8-bits at a time allowing a 





D. Filtering to reduce noise and improve pattern recognition 
For cryptography running on devices at higher clock speeds 
the power contributions from each round of processing will 
tend to merge with each other, as discussed in [21]. As shown 
in Fig. 1 (a), the AES encryption algorithm running at 2MHz 
exhibits separate and distinct rounds of processing. It can be 
observed that the power consumption fully decays back to the 
background noise level before commencing the next round of 
processing. In Fig. 1 (b) however, running the same algorithm, 
but this time at 24MHz, it can be observed that the rounds of 
processing occur closely together and the power consumption 
does not have time to decay before the next round of 
processing. The resultant waveform is a larger single shape 
with smaller ripple peaks for each round. The processing peaks 
vary in height between the rounds and also across trace 
acquisitions, making a cross-correlated pattern extraction of the 
individual rounds difficult. 
 
Figure 1.  (a) AES encryption operating at 2MHz – the rounds are distinct 
and well suited to a pattern extraction. (b) Operating at 24MHz – the rounds 
are now merging, making pattern extraction difficult. 
The suitable application of a filter can help to improve the 
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the data, as well as improving 
the visual appearance to allow features of interest to be 
identified for simple power analysis and/or realignment. 
 
Figure 2.  AES encryption filtered at 100 MHz. 
By applying a low pass filter, the higher frequency noise 
components can be attenuated. Fig. 2 shows the result of a 
100MHz low pass filter applied to the waveform of Fig. 1 (b). 
The individual rounds are now more clearly visible, providing a 
discernible pattern. However, it is still difficult to do an 
extraction of the individual rounds due to the large amplitude 
variation between the rounds and also the difference in 
amplitude between rounds in successive traces, where on 
occasion the round may merge into the pattern, such as the 
second round, highlighted as R2 in Fig. 2.  
Barenghi et al. also showed that a series of band pass filters 
can be used to extract the system clock frequency and selected 
harmonics, where significant side-channel information may be 
found [11], whilst rejecting other unrelated frequencies. 
E. Alignment of Traces 
When mounting an attack in the time domain, it is 
important that the data set is well aligned, so that the same 
point in the encryption algorithm is occurring at the same data 
point across the trace set. Misalignment may be caused by lack 
of a readily available and consistent signal to trigger the scope, 
or there may be some other activity interrupting the processing 
flow in the device. Additionally some form of countermeasure 
that inserts a random delay or dummy data operation could be 
present in an attempt to thwart an attack. In such cases the 
traces would need to be pre-processed to obtain the data in a re-
aligned format. 
Several realignment techniques have been proposed. 
Integrating a windowed portion of the misaligned traces was 
proposed by Clavier et al. in [19], although this approach also 
introduces a reduction in the correlation coefficient of the order 
of the square-root of the window width [21]. Homma et al. 
focused on small, high resolution shifting of traces [8]; 
however this is unsuitable for dealing with larger shift amounts 
introduced by longer delays and other processing interruptions. 
In research by Gebotys et al. [9], the data is transformed to the 
frequency domain, with the phase information then replaced 
across the data set with the phase of one of the acquisitions 
chosen at random. The theoretical analysis assumed an 
idealised, noise free, set of source traces, shifted by an arbitrary 
amount, and it was acknowledged that there would be a phase 
error introduced by noise in a real-world signal. Another 
strategy by Hodgers et al. [10], exploits the enhanced swing of 
the power emanations in an EM attack. Here inter-round 
boundaries of minimal processing power were identified, 
permitting the individual rounds to be extracted and re-aligned. 
However, this method requires that the waveform exhibited a 
large enough peak-to-trough swing to permit a common 
threshold level to be established across the trace set. The cross 
correlation techniques described in [22] are suitable for 
scenarios where the power consumption patterns are distinct 
and repeatable; however, as we move to higher processing 
clock frequencies where the rounds merge into one another, 
these techniques become less applicable. 
III. PHASE-SENSITIVE DETECTOR FILTER 
The Fourier series demonstrates that any signal may be 
decomposed into a sum of sine waves of varying frequency, 
amplitude and phase. In addition, when sine waves of differing 
frequency or phase are multiplied together, they will result in a 
zero averaged value, unless they are of exactly the same 
frequency and phase, in which case the trigonometric identity 
of the product of two sinusoids applies. These properties are 
exploited in a phase-sensitive detector (PSD) circuit, also often 
referred to as a lock-in amplifier, where an input signal is 
multiplied with a reference sinusoidal waveform to determine if 
the input signal contains the reference frequency. The non-
matching frequencies are then normally discarded through the 
use of a steep low pass filter, enabling a low amplitude signal 
of a chosen frequency carrier to be detected in amongst a larger 
background noise level. 
The magnitude of the PSD,     , is the product of two 
sinusoids and is expressed as; 
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Where, 
    is the magnitude of the input waveform 
     is the magnitude of the reference waveform 
    is the angular frequency of the input waveform 
     is the angular frequency of the reference waveform 
    is the phase of the input waveform 
     is the phase of the reference waveform 
This reduces down to two AC signals, one difference 
frequency term            and another sum frequency term 
           [14]. Since          for the chosen 
frequency, the difference term reduces to 
       
 
, a DC term 
proportional to the signal amplitude. 
At this stage the sum frequency term,           , which 
is all the input Fourier frequency components that make up the 
input signal, summed with our reference frequency, are usually 
removed with a low pass filter. However, in the context of a 
side-channel attack, it is actually this sum frequency term 
which is of interest since it contains the relevant side-channel 
leakage. Rather than filter out the sum frequencies with a low 
pass filter, if we control the relaxation of the low pass filter’s 
cut-off, we can now control the passing of these summed 
frequencies through to the signal output. The property of this 
output is that the amplitudes of the frequencies closely 
associated with our reference frequency are promoted, thus 
creating a pattern that accentuates the round peaks. Continued 
relaxing of the filter will eventually enable all frequency 
components to pass through, recombining to produce the 
original input waveform again. 
As noted, the input has to be in phase with the reference 
frequency to generate an output, however if we multiply the 
same input by a second, separate reference, also at the same 
frequency but this time     out of phase (therefore multiplying 
with a cosine) we generate a separate output which is 
orthogonal to the first. We now have two output vectors, 
known as the in-phase and quadrature components 
respectively. By computing the resultant magnitude of these 
orthogonal vectors, the phase dependency is removed and we 
no longer need to be concerned with the phase difference 
between    and    . This ‘two element’ PSD arrangement is 
shown in Fig. 3. The input waveform initially passes through a 
high pass filter to remove any DC offset. The signal is then 
split and passed through the sine and cosine multipliers, before 
passing through the low pass filters, where the cut-off 
frequency can be adjusted. The signal components are then 
squared and summed and then the square root operation applied 



















Figure 3.  The Phase-Sensitive Detector. Controlling the low pass filter cut-
off frequencies enables the manipulation of the output waveform pattern. 
The result of adjusting the cut off frequency can be seen in 
Fig. 4. With a stop frequency of less than 1 MHz, the sum 
frequency components are mostly filtered out and only the DC 
term is passed. As the stop frequency is increased to 24 MHz, 
Fig. 4(a), we can see that some semblance of the waveform 
shape appears. In Fig. 4(b), the stop frequency is set to 38 
MHz, and further sum frequencies are passed, causing the 
output signal to grow in amplitude and to define the enhanced 
round pattern. At 48 MHz, Fig. 4(c), the overall amplitude is 
increased further. Finally setting the stop frequency to 96 MHz, 
Fig. 4(d), leads to the creation of a pattern that closely 
resembles the filtered result of Fig. 2. Raising the stop 
frequency to a high level such as 1GHz, essentially removes 
the filter effect, with the sum and difference components 
recombining, outputting the original input waveform. Control 
of the stop frequency therefore enables us to manipulate the 
output waveform pattern to better suit a thresholding approach, 
such as that shown in Fig. 6 (b). 
 
Figure 4.  The Phase-sensitive detector processed output with stop 
frequencies of (a) 24 MHz (b) 38 MHz (c) 48 MHz (d) 96 MHz. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. Experimental Setup 
We implemented the AES-128 algorithm [7] on a VIRTEX-
II FPGA, loading it onto a SASEBO-G side channel attack 
board [15], running with a clock frequency of 24 MHz. The 
design is shown in Fig. 6, and is an iterative architecture which 
computes a complete round every clock cycle. The key is 
generated in parallel and only the current sub-key is stored in a 
register. The s-boxes are implemented as asynchronous lookup 
tables in the slice logic of the FPGA. The design also has a 
separate feature where AES execution can be randomly 
delayed through use of liner feedback shift registers to 
implement a simple random delay countermeasure. 
 
Figure 5.  The custom AES-128 implementation loaded onto the SASEBO-G. 
A controlling PC was used to send a series of 5000 random 
plaintexts with a constant key to the AES encryption engine, 
with an Agilent MSO6104A oscilloscope used to record the 
trace data at 4GS/s. Each trace was randomly offset from the 
trigger signal using the random delay insertion feature. 
The phase-sensitive detector circuit of Fig. 3 was 
implemented in MATLAB, with the recorded power traces fed 
through at the input. The Sine and Cosine references were 
generated as discrete waveforms using the same sample rate as 
that for the power traces. The reference frequency was set at 24 
MHz and the stop frequency of the low pass filter set to 
48MHz, generating the PSD processed output illustrated in Fig. 
6 (b).  
 
Figure 6.  The original waveform (a) was processed through phase-sensitive 
detector output (b). A threshold was then selected and applied across the data 
set to extract the round peaks for re-alignment. 
The MATLAB filtfilt function was used for the low pass 
filter since this generates a zero-phase digital filter, avoiding 
the introduction of lag into the PSD response. Note the final 
large peak in Fig. 6 (b) is due to the power consumption while 
data is transferred through the FPGA output bus (it is not round 
10 of AES). This has no bearing on either the re-alignment, or 
the subsequent CPA attack as the bus was held low during the 
round processing. 
A thresholding operation was applied, see Fig. 6 (b), to 
automate the extraction of the round peak positions to enable 
count across of the rounds and extract the common round peaks 
positions as a marker for calculating the relative delta. Each 
trace was then shifted by its delta value from the reference to 
re-align the trace, as shown in Fig. 7 (a), where the 5000 traces 
are plotted on top of each other, showing clear alignment. 
A correlation attack was then carried out against a single 
byte of the sub-key in round 10, which successfully revealed 
the correct key byte of 152, as highlighted in Fig. 7 (b), which 
shows a plot of all 256 key values. Note that the correlation 
attack was carried out directly on the PSD output; we did not 
need to refer back to the original raw trace set. This shows that 
the PSD output retains the important side-channel information. 
 
Figure 7.  (a) The 5000  realigned PSD traces show a clear aligment. (b) The 
round 10 correlation attack is successful with 5000 traces. 
To ensure that the result was not just due to the filtering 
effect of the PSD processing, the experiment was repeated, but 
this time without carrying out the realignment step. As 
illustrated in Fig. 8 (b), the correlation was unsuccessful after 
5000 traces.  
 
Figure 8.  (a) The 5000 traces after PSD processing, but without alignment. 
(b) The correlation attack is unsuccessful 
B. Encryption Signature Extraction for Cartography 
The analysis was extended further by undertaking a 
cartography analysis of the Virtex-II FPGA chip of the 
SASEBO-G. A set of traces was acquired, scanning across the 
entire chip surface using a Rohde&Schwarz H 2,5-2 magnetic 
field probe [16]. A grid of 20 mm x 20 mm was covered with a 
resolution of 1mm per step and a trace recorded at each 
location. 
The traces were then processed through the phase-sensitive 
detector algorithm, with the reference frequency set at 12 MHz 
and the low pass filter stop set at 24 MHz, to enhance the peaks 
as shown in Fig. 9 (b). A threshold level was determined by 
inspection of Fig. 9 (b) at amplitude of 0.5. The traces, where 
the width between the two prominent peaks was with ± 10% of 
Fig. 9 (b), were deemed to match the encryption signature and 
were therefore identified as containing a detectable pattern. The 
selection of traces was automated with a simple comparison 
script in MATLAB, using the above parameters. 
 
Figure 9.  The PSD was used to extract the two-peak characteristic signature 
shown in (b). The peaks identify the 1st round and data output operations. 
The results were plotted in Fig. 10, which uses the dots to 
illustrate where the encryption signature was detected. This 
differs from the work of Sauvage et al. [17], where only areas 
of self-similar signals are found, which may or may not be 
encryption related emanations. In this work we identify the 
cartography locations where the encryption signal is detectable 
through our PSD processing, determining the positions where it 
will be advantageous to gather power traces and mount side-
channel analysis with increased efficiency and confidence. 
It is interesting to note that the encryption algorithm pattern 
was detected across the FPGA’s entire package area, whereas 
little was detected in the central core area. This implies 
detection is coming primarily from the I/O pins of the Virtex-II 
Pro which are at a 3.3V level, compared to the core at 1.5V. 
 
Figure 10.  The cartography attack results. The dots represent locations where 
the encryption signature was detected. 
V. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
In this work we have introduced a novel application of the 
phase-sensitive detector in the extraction of characteristic 
signatures from side channel measurements and shown that this 
can be used for the purposes of re-alignment and for successful 
correlation attacks. We have also applied this pre-processing 
technique to distinguish optimal locations to perform electro-
magnetic attacks in conjunction with side-channel cartography. 
Interesting future work could be the use of an analog phase-
sensitive detector. As the signal processing in the analysis was 
undertaken post oscilloscope sampling, extra quantization noise 
was introduced with the oscilloscope’s vertical resolution 
having to cover a larger range due to the high-frequency noise. 
An analogue phase-sensitive detector circuit could be 
constructed to pre-process and amplify the waveforms prior to 
acquisition, which should reduce the quantization noise. This 
should in turn lead to a greater SNR and key recovery in fewer 
traces. 
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